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Introduction
During the visit of Pope Francis this year, the
Vatican head of state remarked about the
“scandalous social inequality” in the country and
urged political leaders (and everyone) to shun
corruption that harms the poor. In this Policy
Note, we examine trends in official (monetary)
poverty statistics. We also look into why poverty
reduction has been historically lackluster in the
Philippines using available panel data that
provide information on dynamics of household
welfare and living conditions in the country.
Trends in poverty statistics
In April 2014, the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA) released official estimates of poverty for
the first half of 2013. These were based on the
2013 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS).
Using these official poverty rates and estimates of
(income) poverty from the previous year,
government officials1 suggested that the welfare
conditions in the country are improving, and
even attributed the reduction in poverty to the
impact of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino
Program, the conditional cash transfer program
(CCT) being implemented by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development. Even the World
Bank, in the August 2014 edition of its
Philippine Economic Update2 similarly described
the improving poverty situation in the country:
“after many years of slow poverty reduction,
poverty incidence among the population declined
by 3 percentage points between 2012 and 2013
______________
1 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/647199/palace-banners
-decline-in-poverty-incidence-amid-slight-increase-in-self
-rated-poverty; http://www.rappler.com/business/economy
-watch/56708-ph-poverty-incidence-downward-neda;
accessed on November 24, 2014.
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/philippines/
publication/philippines-accelerating-public-investment-to
-sustain-growth-that-benefits-the-poor; accessed on
November 24, 2014.
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to 24.9 %, lifting 2.5 million Filipinos out of
poverty.”
Although these poverty assessments are based on
the official statistics released by the PSA, official
poverty incidence figures estimated for the first
half of 2013 actually are not comparable to those
sourced from the Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (FIES), the typical source of per capita
income data to generate poverty incidence (Table
1). While the APIS 2013 used a much longer
questionnaire that was based on the FIES income
module, the APIS 2013 income module was still a
simplified version of the FIES income module,
thus making the poverty estimates from APIS
2013 incomparable to those sourced from the
2012 FIES. Even if the 2013 APIS made use of the
income module of the FIES, per
capita income data from the
two surveys may still not be
technically comparable since
the FIES uses a very detailed
expenditure module that is
asked before the income
module. The FIES takes an
average of five hours to
accomplish, while the 2013
APIS only took an average of
three hours. The PSA’s technical
notes3 describe these different
data sources and instruments.
In consequence, we actually do not have clear
evidence to suggest a reduction in poverty from
(the first half of) 2012 to (the first semester of)
2013. We have to await results of the 2014 APIS
to get a definitive picture of recent poverty
trends, assuming that the 2014 APIS used either
the same instrument as the 2013 APIS or the
FIES. Still, we can observe three very clear trends,
albeit not very recent information, on poverty
conditions in the country from official poverty
statistics sourced from the FIES:
(a) Poverty rates have been unchanged4 in the
first semester periods from 2006 to 2012,
since minute differences in poverty estimates
are within margins of error;
(b) Poverty rates during the full year periods
from 2006 to 2012 also have been
unchanged5;
(c) Poverty rates are lower in the full year,
compared to the first semester figures, on
account of extra income received by income
earners from their thirteenth month wages and
bonuses, as well as their income received in
the second semester.
______________
3 http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/75364-real
-score-poverty; http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2013/
2013_FirstSem_%20TechnicalNotes.asp; (accessed on
November 24, 2014).
4 http://www.nscb.gov.ph/pressreleases/2013/PR-201304
-NS1-04_poverty.asp (accessed on November 24, 2014).
5 http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2012/highlights
_fullyear.asp (accessed on November 24, 2014).
Table 1. Official estimates of poverty incidence in the Philippines
Year      First Full Calendar   Source Remarks
Semestera         Yearb
2006 28.8% 26.3 % 2006 FIES
2009 28.6% 26.1 % 2009 FIES
2012 27.9% 25.3 % 2012 FIES 78 pages of questions (24 of which on
income, 47 on expenditure); average
interview time is 5 hours
2013 24.9% 2013 APIS 32 pages of questions (19 of which on
income, 6 on expenditure); average
interview time is 3 hours
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)
Notes:
a =  http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2012/highlights_1stsem.asp (accessed on November 24, 2014).
b = http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2012/highlights_fullyear.asp (accessed on November 24, 2014).
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It can be noted that since poverty
incidence is unchanged, the number of
poor Filipinos has been increasing on
account of population growth.
Reasons for unchanged
poverty rates
It may seem puzzling why despite
growth in the country’s gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita (of 3.3%)
over the past decade, the poverty rates
have been unchanged (WB 2014). Using recent
national accounts data and official poverty
figures from the FIES (Table 2), we find that a 1-
percent increase in per capita incomes reduces
the poverty rate by around 0.2–0.3 percent,
which is far lower than the average of 2.5-percent
elasticity of poverty reduction in the world.
Some might suggest that there are data quality
problems with national accounts data or income
poverty data. However, the Philippines follows
standard practices in national accounting using
the 2008 System of National Accounts framework
suggested by the United Nations. Developing
countries like the Philippines have statistical
systems that pay attention to consistency in
measurement, although there may be room for
improvement in simplifying current survey
instruments.
Some attribute the weak impact of economic
growth on poverty reduction to the country’s high
income inequality. In Table 3, we show some
selected statistics on income distribution and
income inequality in the Philippines from 2003
to 2009. Average nominal incomes of various
segments of income distribution were rising
across the years (by around 43% between 2003
and 2006, and by around 40% between 2006 and
2009), and even across various income classes.
From 2003 to 2009, the poorest 20 percent
though only had about 5 percent of the total
national income. And as indicated by the Palma
ratio, a measure of income inequality, the income
of the top 10 percent has been steady at around
three times that of the income of the bottom 40
percent. The Gini coefficient, another measure of
income inequality, has been around 0.5 across
the period 2003–2009. Thus income distribution
has practically been unchanged. The poor have
not gotten any poorer.
Examining economic mobility
It may be argued that increasing income inequality
is not a distributional problem: as an economy
expands, entrepreneurs with better command over
assets and capital are in far better positions to
benefit from economic growth. In other words,
income inequality grows because these people’s
incomes are growing faster than the income of the
rest (Piketty 2014). However, the benefits of the
economic growth should start to trickle down to
the masses as entrepreneurs create more jobs for the
working class. At this point, variations in economic
outcomes will just be a reflection of differences in
the levels of effort. In the latter case, we will
Table 2. Poverty elasticity estimates for 2006–2009 and 2009–2012
2003 2006 2009 2012
Official poverty headcount 26.56 26.27 25.23
Per capita GDP (constant PHP) 48525.93 53982.09 57649.88 65266.08
Total percent change 2003-2006 2006-2009 2009-2012
     in official poverty headcount  -1.1%  -4.0%
    in per capita GDP 11.2% 6.8% 13.2%
Growth elasticity of poverty  -0.16  -0.30
Note: Authors’ calculations based on national accounts and official poverty estimates.
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experience inequality of outcomes (Roemer 1993).
On the other hand, inequality of opportunities
arises when socioeconomic advantages and
disadvantages (of some over others) accumulate
over time (Bowles and Gintis 2002).
Despite the seemingly simple conceptual
difference between inequality of outcomes and
inequality of opportunities, finding evidence
from empirical data is not quite straightforward
(Brunori et al. 2013). Recently, some researchers
identified economic mobility as a good starting
point to be able to differentiate these two types
of inequalities (Martinez et al. 2014; Martinez et
al. n.d.). Broadly speaking, economic mobility
refers to the patterns in which people move from
one socioeconomic status to another over time
(Fields 2008). The level of economic mobility is
low when people remain in the same
socioeconomic status over time and it increases
as more people move from one status to another.
Low economic mobility can be associated to
inequality of opportunities since in such a case,
there is not much incentive to work hard due to
limited opportunities for economic movements
(Brunori et al. 2013).
Consider a simple scenario where a new job
opening in a certain company has been
advertised. Suppose that out of 10 people who
applied for the job, the company shortlisted the
two most skilled applicants. In this case, being
shortlisted or not represents inequality of
outcomes. However, suppose that during the
selection process, the committee systematically
favored the applicant with a certain set of
characteristics that are beyond a person’s control,
such as sex, ethnicity, religion, parents’ economic
status, among others. This represents inequality
of opportunities.
More generally, inequality of opportunities refer
to instances when the economic opportunities
created by economic growth are
disproportionately channelled to people that have
a specific set of fixed characteristics while
inequality of outcomes occur when skills or levels
of effort are the main determinants of how
economic opportunities are distributed (LeFranc
et al. 2008).
So why do we say that low levels of economic
mobility signal inequality of opportunities? If
the society rewards people according to gender,
race, or privilege inherited from parents, then
there is less incentive to work hard.
Consequently, people will remain in the same
economic status. Furthermore, the disparities will
widen as economic advantage and disadvantage
accumulate over time. This is suspected to be the
Table 3. Selected statistics on income inequality
and (per capita) income distribution
in the Philippines: 2003, 2006, and 2009
Statistics 2003 2006 2009
Average per capita income
(in nominal PHP) 
Poorest 20 percent  7015 9494 14022
Lower middle 20 percent  12461 16747 24396
Middle 20 percent  19476 26404 37606
Upper middle 20 percent  32014 44247 62129
Richest 20 percent  85891 127926 176863
Total  31369 44963 62997
Share of bottom 20 percent
in national income 4.48%  4.22%  4.45%
Palma ratio (i.e., income of the
top 10% to bottom 40%)   3.09  3.47   3.27
Gini 0.495  0.516 0.506
Note: Authors’ calculations from the Family Income Expenditure Survey (FIES)
2003, 2006, and 2009
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driving force for the lack of changes in income
distribution in the country.
Can we examine these concepts using empirical
data? To answer this question, we firstly define
economic status with income as a proxy measure,
and consequently, equate economic mobility
with income mobility. In the following section,
we examine how much income mobility transpired
in the Philippines over the past decade.
How much income mobility there is
in the Philippines?
The discussion provided in this section is mainly
drawn from the work of Martinez et al. (2014)
which uses panel data from the FIES from 2003 to
2009. This period is interesting because it
captures a period of global economic slowdown.
In addition, during this period, while there was
faster economic growth compared to periods
before 2000, both poverty and income inequality
barely changed during these years. These trends
give an impression that the income distribution
has been stagnant (Martinez et al. 2014).
To further examine the extent of stagnancy of
income distribution, Martinez et al. (2014)
measured the amount of income mobility. To do
this, the authors divided the panel households
from the FIES into extremely poor, moderately
poor, lower middle income, middle income, upper
middle income, and rich according to their
household consumption expenditure per capita.6
Table 4 presents the transition matrix that
summarizes how much economic movements
occurred. The number provided in each row
represents the proportion of households starting
in a specific economic status and ending up in
the same or another status. The diagonal
elements represent households that remain in the
same status. The numbers below the diagonal
elements represent households that moved down
the income ladder while the numbers above the
diagonal elements represent households that
experienced improvements in the income status.
Almost half of the households changed income
status from 2003 to 2009. For instance, 51
percent of the households that started in extreme
poverty in 2003 moved up while 77 percent of
the households that started nonpoor moved down
the income ladder. Although not shown in Table
1, Martinez et al. (2014) also noted that there is
approximately the same number of households
that experienced upward and downward income
movements. The offsetting effects between
upward and downward income mobility could
partially explain why the country’s aggregate
level of poverty and inequality are barely
changing. Thus, overall, income distribution has
actually been more dynamic than conventionally
perceived, but there is also evidence of offsetting
effects between upward and downward income
mobility (Martinez et al. 2014), which leads to
gross nil changes in the country’s aggregate level
of poverty and inequality.
Who are the income mobile?
Martinez et al. (n.d.) classified the income
trajectories into four types: households that
experienced (i) slow income growth from 2003 to
2009; (ii) consistently upward income growth;
(iii) consistently downward income growth; (iv)
upward income growth followed by downward
income movements; and (v) downward income
______________
6 This has been adjusted to account for inflation and
differences in household size.
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movements followed by upward growth (Figure
1). Based on this classification, Martinez et al.
(n.d.) found that approximately 11 percent of the
household population fall in the slow growth
cluster, 31 percent in the upward mobility
cluster, 24 percent in the downward mobility
cluster, 14 percent in the upward-downward
mobility cluster, and 20 percent in the
downward-upward mobility cluster. The authors
also estimated multinomial logistic models to
identify the statistically significant
characteristics that distinguish one group from
another. Their results suggest that households
with initially lower income were more likely to
be classified under upward mobility cluster while
households with initially higher income were
more likely to be classified under the fourth and
fifth cluster.7 This result suggests that the
economic growth process is somewhat pro-poor
because on the average, the income of the poor
grew faster than that of the nonpoor. However,
this process of income convergence is slow
because significant pockets of the population
experience either slow growth spells or fluctuating
incomes. Volatilities in income suggest the need
for policies and programs to target not only the
poor but especially the nearly poor.
On the other hand, the sex of the household head
is not a statistically significant correlate of
income mobility group membership but the
head’s educational attainment is. In particular,
households whose heads were better educated
were more likely to be classified under the
upward mobility cluster. This suggests that current
efforts of government for investing in the CCT to
improve educational attainments are likely to
have profound empowering effects in the future.
Summary and policy implications
The Philippines has recently experienced
economic growth despite the global economic
______________
7 This pattern is robust across different model specifications.
Table 4. Income transition matrix, 2003–2009
2009
Extreme Moderate Low middle Middle Upper middle  Rich
poverty  poverty    income income       income
Extreme poverty 0.4942 0.3951 0.1045 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000
Moderate poverty 0.2185 0.4219 0.3341 0.0243 0.0007 0.0004
Low middle income 0.0423 0.1983 0.5660 0.1860 0.0074 0.0000
Middle income 0.0040 0.0231 0.2933 0.5776 0.0934 0.0085
Upper middle income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0487 0.5298 0.3644 0.0572
Rich 0.0000 0.0000 0.0221 0.2665 0.4836 0.2279
Source: Martinez et al. (2014)
Note: The first group consists of incomes not exceeding USD 1.25/day that is considered as an extreme form of
income poverty, the second group consists of incomes falling in between USD 1.25 and USD 2 (moderate poverty),
third group consists of incomes falling in between USD 2 and USD 4 (lower middle income), fourth group consists of
incomes falling in between USD 4 and USD 10 (middle income), fifth group consists of incomes falling in between
USD 10 and USD 20 (upper middle income), and last group consists of incomes exceeding USD 20/day (rich). The
cut-off points are expressed as daily per capita expenditure in 2005 PPP USD.
20
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slowdown. While this economic growth has
attracted more foreign investments which, in
turn, are creating more economic opportunities,
it will be important to regularly examine
historical statistics on income poverty and
income distribution. Government has suggested
that poverty has substantially reduced from the
first half of 2012 to the first half of 2013, but
this assessment was based on incomparable
poverty diagnostics. Poverty rates have been
unchanged from 2003 to 2012. There are people
who wonder why economic growth has not
translated into poverty reduction. The levels of
income inequality have also barely changed, a
pattern that could mean that the new
opportunities created by economic growth do not
allow the income of the poor to catch up with
the rest.
On the other hand, inequality is a natural
outcome of economic growth since people with
access to capital are more likely to reap the
benefits of growth first. What is critical is to
make economic growth truly inclusive.
In this Policy Note, we pointed out that in the
period 2003–2009, poor Filipinos were more
likely to experience higher income growth, but
2003 2006 2009
Cluster1
2003 2006 2009
Cluster2
2003 2006 2009
Cluster3
2003 2006 2009
Cluster4
2003 2006 2009
Cluster5
Source: Martinez et al. (n.d.)
Note: Households that experienced slow to moderate income growth (at most +/- 5% per year) in both 2003–2006
and 2006–2009 periods are grouped in the first cluster. Households that observed consistently positive or
consistently negative growth rates, wherein at least one growth rate exceeds 5 percent, are classified under the
second or third cluster, respectively. Lastly, households that experienced highly positive income growth (> 5%) in
2003–2006 yet highly negative income growth (< -5%) in 2006–2009 are classified in the fourth cluster while
households that experienced highly negative growth (< -5%) in 2003–2006 followed by highly positive growth (>
5%) in 2006–2009 are classified in the fifth cluster.
Figure 1. Different types of income trajectories, 2003–2009
PN 2015-04
8
Policy Notes
For further information, please contact
The Research Information Staff
Philippine Institute for Development Studies
NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, 1229 Makati City
Telephone Nos: (63-2) 894-2584 and 893-5705
Fax Nos: (63-2) 893-9589 and 816-1091
E-mail: jrgalbert@gmail.com; a.martinez2@uq.edu.au; publications@pids.gov.ph
The Policy Notes series is available online at http://www.pids.gov.ph. Reentered as
second class mail at the Business Mail Service Office under Permit No. PS-570-04
NCR. Valid until December 31, 2015.
some nonpoor also have been vulnerable to slide
into poverty. A significant fraction of Filipinos
experience erratic income fluctuations. Almost
half of the country’s population, whether they are
poor, middle class, or upper income, experience
either slow income growth or a combination of
upward and downward mobility. For every
household that experienced upward income
mobility, there is approximately one household
that experienced downward mobility as well. This
suggests that government should not only be
concerned with the poor, but should also have
policy instruments to assist those who are
nonpoor but plagued by economic risks.
Policymakers need to develop policies for risk
management, such as adequate insurance and
social protection coverage (ADB 2007; Bird and
Hill 2009; Reyes and Tabuga 2012). While some
social protection mechanisms such as the CCT are
promising to yield long-term effects on income
distribution, it will be important to monitor and
evaluate the effectiveness of existing social
protection infrastructure in the Philippines
because if left unaddressed, income shocks may
hamper the thrust for inclusive growth and for
sustained prospects of the country’s
development. 
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